In this paper, we gave an attack on RSA when ϕ(N ) has small multiplicative inverse modulo e and the prime sum p + q is of the form p + q = 2 n k0 + k1 where n is a given positive integer and k0 and k1 are two suitably small unknown integers using sublattice reduction techniques and Coppersmith's methods for finding small roots of modular polynomial equations. When we compare this method with an approach using lattice based techniques, this procedure slightly improves the bound and reduces the lattice dimension.
Introduction
RSA Cryptosystem is the first public key cryptosystem invented by Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adalman in 1977 where the encryption and decryption are based on the fact that if N = pq, is the modulus for RSA, p, q distinct primes, if 1 ≤ e ≤ ϕ(N ) with (e, ϕ(N )) = 1 and d, the multiplicative inverse of e modulo ϕ(N ), then m ed = m mod N , for any message m, an integer in Z N . The security of this system depends on the difficulty of finding factors of a composite positive integer, that is product of two large primes. In 1990, M.J.Wiener [20] was the first one to describe a cryptanalytic attack on the use of short RSA deciphering exponent d. This attack is based on continued fraction algorithm which finds the fraction t d , where t = ed−1 ϕ(n) in a polynomial time when d is less than N 0.25 for N = pq and q < p < 2q. Using lattice reduction approach based on the Coppersmith techniques [7] for finding small solutions of modular bivariate integer polynomial equations, D. Boneh and G. Durfee [4] improved the wiener result from N 0.25 to N 0.292 in 2000 and J. Blömer and A. May [5] has given an RSA attack for d less than N 0.29 in 2001, that requires lattices of dimension smaller than the approach by Boneh and Durfee. In 2006, E. Jochemsz and A. May [10] , described a strategy for finding small modular and integer roots of multivariate polynomial using lattice-based Coppersmith techniques and by implementing this strategy they gave a new attack on an RSA variant called common prime RSA.
In our paper [2] , first we described an attack on RSA when ϕ(N ) has small multiplicative inverse k of modulo e, the public encryption exponent by using lattice and sublattice based techniques. Let N = pq, q < p < 2q, p − q = N β and e = N α > p + q. As (e, ϕ(N )) = 1, there exist unique r, s such that (p − 1)r ≡ 1(mod e) and (q − 1)s ≡ 1(mod e). For k = rs(mod e), kϕ(N ) ≡ 1(mod e) and define g(x, y) = x(y + B) − 1 where B = N + 1 − 2 √ N . Then the pair (x 0 , y 0 ) = (k, −((p + q) − 2 √ N )) is a solution for the modular polynomial equation g(x, y) ≡ 0(mod e). Now applying the lattice based techniques given by Boneh-Durfee in [4] using x, y shifts and using only x shifts to the above modular polynomial equation, we get the attack bounds for δ, |k| ≤ N δ are δ < respectively. Also we improved the bound for δ up to α − √ αβ by implementing the sublattice based techniques given by Boneh and Durfee in [4] under the condition δ > α − β(1 + α) and improved the bound for δ up to δ < 2α−6β+2
by implementing the sublattice based techniques with lower dimension given by J. Blömer and A. May in [5] , this bound is slightly less than the above bound but this method requires lattices of smaller dimension than the above method. All these attack bounds are depending on the prime difference p−q = N β and α− √ αβ is the maximum upper bound for δ.
Later we described that, for β ≈ 0.5, the maximum bound for δ may be improved if the prime sum p + q is in the form of the composed sum p + q = 2 n k 0 + k 1 where n is a given positive integer and k 0 and k 1 are two suitably small unknown integers. Define the polynomial congruence f (x, y, z) ≡ 0(mode) for f (x, y, z) = (N + 1)x + xy + (2
n is an inverse of 2 n mod e. By using lattice based techniques to the above polynomial congruence, the attack bound for δ is such that δ < Now in this paper we slightly improved the above bound by using the sub-lattice based techniques given by J. Blömer, A. May in [5] to the above polynomial congruence and this method requires lattice of smaller dimension than the above method.
Preliminaries
In this section we state basic results on lattices, described briefly lattice basis reduction, Coppersmith's method and Howgrave-Graham theorem that are based on lattice reduction techniques are described.
m be a set of linearly independent vectors. The lattice L generated by b 1 , b 2 , ..., b n is the set of linear combinations of b 1 , b 2 , ..., b n with coefficients in Z.
A basis for L is any set of independent vectors that generates L. The dimension of L is the number of vectors in a basis for L.
Remark 1.
If L is a full rank lattice, means n = m then the determinant of L is equal to the determinant of the n × n matrix whose rows are the basis vectors b 1 , b 2 , ..., b n .
In 1982, A. K. Lenstra, H. W. Lenstra, Jr. and L. Lovasz [11] invented the LLL lattice based reduction algorithm to reduce a basis and to solve the shortest vector problem in polynomial time. The general result on the size of individual LLL-reduced basis vectors is given in the following Theorem. Theorem 1. Let L be a lattice and b 1 , b 2 , ..., b n be an LLL-reduction basis of L. Then
An important application of lattice reduction found by Coppersmith in 1996 [7] is finding small roots of low-degree polynomial equations. This includes modular univariate polynomial equations and bivariate integer equations. In 1997 Howgrave-Graham [8] reformulated Coppersmith's techniques and proposed a result which shows that if the coefficients of h(x, y) are sufficiently small, then the equality h(x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 holds not only modulo N , but also over integers. The generalization of Howgrave-Graham result in terms of the Euclidean norm of a polynomial h(
n is defined by the Euclidean norm of its coefficient vector i.e., ||h(x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n )|| = a 2 i1...in given as follows:
.., x n ] be an integer polynomial that consists of at most ω monomials. Suppose that
2 , ..., x (0) n ≡ 0 mod e m for some m where |x
n | < X n , and
Then h(x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) = 0 holds over the integers.
Resultant of two polynomials:
The resultant of two polynomials f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) and g(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) with respect to the variable x i for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is defined as the determinant of Sylvester matrix of f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) and g(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) when considered as polynomials in the single indeterminate x i , for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Remark 2. The resultant of two polynomials is non-zero if and only if the polynomials are algebraically independent .
2 , . . . , x (0) n is a common solution of algebraically independent polynomials f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f m for m ≥ n, then these polynomials yield g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g n−1 resultants in n − 1 variables and continuing so on the resultants yield a polynomial t(x i ) in one variable with x i = x (0) i for some i is a solution of t(x i ). Note the polynomials considered to compute resultants are always assumed to be algebraically independent.
An Attack Bound Using Sublattice Reduction Techniques
In this section, an attack bound for a small multiplicative inverse k of ϕ(N ) modulo e when the prime sum p + q is of the form p + q = 2 n k 0 + k 1 , where n is a given positive integer and k 0 and k 1 are two suitably small unknown integers using sublattice reduction techniques is described.
In our paper [2] , we proposed an attack on RSA when ϕ(N ) has small multiplicative inverse modulo e and the prime sum p + q is of the form p + q = 2 n k 0 + k 1 , where n is a given positive integer and k 0 and k 1 are two suitably small unknown integers using lattice reduction techniques.
For 2
n is an inverse of 2 n mod e, define f (x, y, z)= (N + 1)x + xy + (2
is a monomial of f m and
where l is a leading monomial of f and define the shift polynomials as
and f = a −1 l f mod e for the coefficient a l of l. For 0 ≤ k ≤ m, divide the above shift polynomials according to t = 0 and t ≥ 1. Then for t = 0, the shift polynomials g(x, y, z) are
and for t ≥ 1, the shift polynomials h(x, y, z) are
Let L be the lattice spanned by the coefficient vectors g(xX, yY, zZ) and h(xX, yY, zZ) shifts with dimension (
. Let M be the matrix of L with each row is the coefficients of the shift polynomial g-shifts
and each column is the coefficients of each variable (in shift polynomials)
As xy is the leading monomial in f (x, y, z) with coefficient 1, the diagonal elements in the matrix M are g-shifts 
Note that the matrix M is lower triangular matrix. Therefore, the determinant is
where n(e), n(X), n(Y ) and n(Z) are denotes the number of e's, X's, Y 's and Z's in all diagonal elements respectively. Let N δ , N γ1 and N γ2 be the upper bounds for X, max{k 0 , k 1 } and min{k 0 , k 1 } respectively, then the bound for δ in which the generalized Howgrave-Graham result holds given in the following theorem.
and k be the multiplicative inverse of ϕ(N ) modulo e. Suppose the prime sum p + q is of the form p + q = 2 n k 0 + k 1 , for a known positive integer n and for |k| ≤ X, max{|k 0 |, |k 1 |} ≤ Y and min{|k 0 |, |k 1 |} ≤ Z one can factor N in polynomial time if
To improve this bound in a lower dimension than the above dimension, first we construct a sublattice S L of L and after that we apply the sublattice based techniques to the lattice S L given by J. Blömer, A. May in [5] , and are described in the following sections.
Construction of a sublattice S S S L of L
The construction of a sublattice S L of L in order to improve the bound for δ is given in the following.
• First remove some rows in M corresponding to g-shifts, are such that 
• 
Now let S L be the sub-lattice of L spanned by the coefficients of the vectors g s (xX, yY, zZ) and h s (xX, yY, zZ) shifts and M s be the matrix of the lattice S L . Note that the matrix M s is not square. So apply the sublattice based techniques to the basis of S L or the rows of M s to get a square matrix. Using that square matrix, the attack bound can be found and is given in the following section.
Applying sub-lattice based techniques to get an attack bound
In [5] , J. Blomer, A. May proposed a method to find an attack bound for low deciphering exponent in a smaller dimension than the approach by Boneh and Durfee's attack in [4] . Apply their method based on sublattice reduction techniques to our lattice S L to get an attack bound and is described in the following.
In order to apply the Howgrave-Graham's theorem by using Theorem 1, we need three short vectors in S L as our polynomial consists three variables. But note that M s is not a square matrix. So, first construct a square matrix M sl by removing some columns in M s , which are small linear combination of non-removing columns in M s . Then the short vector in M sl lead to short reconstruction vector in S L .
Construction of a square sub-matrix M sl of M s .
Columns in M and M s are same and each column in M is nothing but the coefficients of a variable, which is a leading monomial of the polynomial g or h-shifts. The first ( Proof. For n = 0, ..., m, k 1 = m − n, k 2 = 0, ..., k 1 , the g s -shifts x k1 z k2 f n e k1 corresponds first (
6 m+1) rows in M s and for n = 0, ..., m, k 1 = m−n, k 2 = k 1 +1, ..., k 1 +t, the h s -shifts x k1 z k2 f n e k1 corresponds remaining rows in M s . We prove this theorem in two cases. Given that 0 ≤ a ≤ m − 1. From the above analysis in (1) and (2), the coefficient of
Case(i): Any column in first (
Therefore, the coefficient of x a y b z c is non-zero in g s -shifts x k1 z k2 f n e k1 if and only if a ≥ k 1 , b ≤ m−k 1 , c ≥ k 2 and k 1 = 0, ..., a − b, k 2 = max{0, k 1 − (a − (b + c) )}, ..., min{k 1 , c}.
Similarly we can prove that, the coefficient of x a y b z c is non-zero in h s -shifts x k1 z k2 f n e k1 if and only if a ≥ k 1 , b ≤ m−k 1 , c ≥ k 2 and k 1 = 0, ..., c, k 2 = k 1 +1, ..., min{c, k 1 +t} using the inequalities k 1 +1 ≤ k 2 ≤ k 1 +t, a ≥ b + c and analysis in (1) and (2), and say min{c, k 1 + t} = l t The formula for finding a coefficient of a variable
Note that a column corresponding to a variable x m y m−a z c is in the non-removing columns in M s and coefficient of x m y m−a z c is zero for The coefficient of
c is zero in all rows corresponding to g s -shifts.
The coefficient of
Note that coefficient of x m y m−a z c is zero in all g s -shifts as a > c and for k 1 > a − b in h s -shifts. The columns corresponding to a variable x a y b z c and a variable x m y m−a z c only with non-zero terms is depicted in Table 2 . Therefore, from Table 2 From the above theorem, all columns corresponding to a variable As we removed all depending columns in M s to form a matrix M sl , apply the lattice based techniques to S l instead of S L to get an attack bound and this lattice reduction techniques gives a required short vectors in S L for a given bound.
The matrix M sl is lower triangular with rows same as in M s and each column corresponding to coefficients of one of the variables ( leading monomials of g s and h s -shifts)
Therefore S l is a lattice spanned by coefficient vectors of the shift polynomials g sl (xX, yY, zZ) and h sl (xX, yY, zZ) where
Since S l is full-rank lattice, det
where n(e), n(X), n(Y ), n(Z) are denotes the number of e s, X s, Y s, Z s in all the diagonal elements of M sl respectively. As x n y n is a leading monomial of f n with coefficient 1, we have Take t = τ m, then for sufficiently large m, the exponents n(e), n(X), n(Y ), n(Z) and the dimension ω reduce to
Applying the LLL algorithm to the basis vectors of the lattice S l , i.e., coefficient vectors of the shift polynomials, we get a LLL-reduced basis say {v 1 , v 2 , ..., v ω } and from the Theorem 1 we have
In order to apply the generalization of Howgrave-Graham result in Theorem 2, we need the following inequality 2 ω(ω−1)
from this, we deduce
As the dimension ω is not depending on the public encryption exponent e, √ ω ω−2 is a fixed constant, so we need the inequality det(S l ) < e mω , i.e., e n(e)
Substitute all values and taking logarithms, neglecting the lower order terms and after simplifying by m 3 we get (−1 − 3τ )α + (3 + 6τ )δ + (1 + 3τ )γ 1 + (1 + 3τ + 3τ 2 )γ 2 < 0.
The left hand side inequality is minimized at τ = α−(2δ+γ1+γ2) 2γ2
and putting this value in the above inequality we get
From the first three short vectors v 1 , v 2 and v 3 in LLL reduced basis of a basis B in S l we consider three polynomials g 1 (x, y, z), g 2 (x, y, z) and g 3 (x, y, z) over Z such that g 1 (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) = g 2 (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) = g 3 (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) = 0. These short vectors v 1 , v 2 and v 3 lead to a short vectorv 1 ,v 2 andv 3 respectively andḡ 1 (x, y, z),ḡ 2 (x, y, z) andḡ 3 (x, y, z) its corresponding polynomials. Apply the same analysis in paper [2] to the above polynomials to get the factors p and q of RSA modulus N .
Theorem 5. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Let e = N α , X = N δ , Y = N γ1 , Z = N γ2 and k be the multiplicative inverse of ϕ(N ) modulo e. Suppose the prime sum p + q is of the form p + q = 2 n k 0 + k 1 , for a known positive integer n and for |k| ≤ X, max{|k 0 |, |k 1 |} ≤ Y and min{|k 0 |, |k 1 |} ≤ Z one can factor N in polynomial time if
Proof. Follows from the above argument and the LLL lattice basis reduction algorithm operates in polynomial time [11] .
Note that for any given primes p and q with q < p < 2q, we can always find a positive integer n such that p + q = 2 n k 0 + k 1 where 0 ≤ |k 0 |, |k 1 | ≤≈ 0.25. A typical example is 2 n ≈ 3 √ 2 N 0.25 as p + q < 3 √ 2 N 0.5 [14] . So take γ 1 and γ 2 in the range (0,0.25). Let δ L and δ sl be the bounds for δ in inequalities (1) and (2) respectively. Then note that δ sl is slightly larger than δ L and is depicted in Figure 1 for α = 0.51, 0.55, 0.750 and 1. In the Figure 1 , x, y, z-axis represents γ 1 , γ 2 , bound for δ respectively and yellow, red regions represents δ sl , δ L receptively. From this figure, it is noted that the yellow region is slightly above the red region, i.e., δ sl is slightly grater than δ L and this improvement increases when the values of α increases. smaller than the dimension of L.
Conclusion
In this paper, an another attack bound for k, a small multiplicative inverse of ϕ(N ) modulo e is given when the prime sum p + q is of the form p + q = 2 n k 0 + k 1 where n is a given positive integer and k 0 and k 1 are two suitably small unknown integers using sublattice reduction techniques and Coppersmith's methods for finding small roots of modular polynomial equations. This attack bound is slightly larger than the bound, in the approach using lattice based techniques and requires lattice of smaller dimension than the approach given by using lattice based techniques.
